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OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal stems from a stash-house robbery sting operation that took place 
in Philadelphia from June to July of 2012.  Of the eight individuals caught in the 
operation, three pled guilty prior to trial.1  Following their convictions in a joint 
trial, the remaining five,2 including Appellant Frank Thompson, filed separate 
appeals, each contesting various issues relating to their convictions (and, for some, 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 These were Najee Murray, Lafayette Rawls, and Jamie Dales. 
2 Thompson’s co-defendants at trial were Marlon Graham, Kareem Long, Kenneth 
Parnell, and Robert Lamar Whitfield.  Separate opinions resolving each co-
defendant’s appeal have been, or will be, filed.  See United States v. Graham, No. 
14-3717; United States v. Long, No. 14-3703; United States v. Whitfield, No. 14-
3345; United States v. Parnell, No. 14-4100. 
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their sentences).  For the reasons explained below, we will uphold Thompson’s 
convictions.   
I. 
 In June of 2012, a confidential informant (CI) contacted Robert Lamar 
Whitfield and asked him for help getting in touch with a mutual acquaintance so 
that the CI could invite the acquaintance to rob a drug stash house.  Whitfield 
instead volunteered to take care of the robbery himself, claiming that he had 
significant experience robbing stash houses in the past.  The CI then put Whitfield 
in touch with the CI’s “uncle,” who turned out to be an undercover agent for the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).  Whitfield met with the agent 
on several occasions to discuss the robbery.  To facilitate the crime, Whitfield 
recruited others to join in the scheme, who in turn recruited others, including 
Thompson.  
 Plans came to a head on July 18 when Thompson and seven others met with 
the undercover agent in the parking lot of a Hilton Hotel where the agent once 
again told those present about the robbery, including that he expected ten 
kilograms of cocaine to be inside the stash house, and that he expected the house to 
be guarded by two men, one with a pistol and the other within reach of an assault-
style rifle.  The agent then made clear that any who wished to withdraw should do 
so at that time.  After no one expressed hesitation about the plan, the group 
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proceeded to a junkyard, presumably to check out a van that the agent was to have 
rented for use during the robbery.  There, the group continued making preparations 
for the robbery, with several individuals arranging and inspecting firearms and 
distributing gloves to all present.  At the undercover agent’s signal, law 
enforcement officials swarmed the yard and arrested the group.   
 A grand jury returned an indictment charging each of the co-conspirators 
with multiple inchoate Hobbs Act robbery and drug distribution offenses, as well 
as with the crime of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 
or a drug trafficking crime.  Additionally, Thompson, Long, and Dales were 
charged with being felons in possession of a firearm, though Thompson and Long 
were both acquitted at trial on this count.  The jury convicted Thompson and the 
four other defendants on all counts for which they were mutually charged.  
Thompson was subsequently sentenced to 252 months in prison.  He then timely 
filed this appeal.3 
II. 
 Thompson argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support his convictions on the Hobbs Act and cocaine possession 
                                                 
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
 5 
 
conspiracy charges.4  We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
“from the perspective of a reasonable juror.”  United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  We must uphold the jury’s 
verdict “as long as it does not ‘fall below the threshold of bare rationality.’”  Id. 
(quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012)).  To convict someone 
of a conspiracy crime, the jury must find the following elements: “(1) a shared 
unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and (3) an 
agreement to work toward that goal.”  Id. at 425.  Importantly, the prosecution 
need not adduce any direct evidence to prove intent; circumstantial evidence may 
suffice.  Id. at 431.   
 We conclude that the evidence of Thompson’s guilt on the conspiracy 
charges was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.  Although the evidence against 
Thompson was perhaps not as strong as against some of his co-defendants, he 
nonetheless attended the “informational” meeting with the undercover agent at the 
Hilton and then proceeded to the junkyard with the others.  He also expressed no 
hesitation about participating in the scheme, even after the agent gave everyone the 
opportunity to back out.  Finally, he openly discussed the robbery with one of his 
                                                 
4 Although the subheading of his brief addressing the insufficiency claim mentions 
the attempt charges, the substance of his arguments clearly centers on sufficiency 
of the evidence for the conspiracy charges.  We will therefore treat as forfeited any 
insufficiency claims going to the attempt charges.   
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co-conspirators.  Thus, his assertion that his “involvement” was marked by 
“inaction and silence” rings hollow.5 
III. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment as to Thompson. 
 
                                                 
5 Thompson raises a couple other issues that some or all of his co-defendants have 
also raised.  First, he claims that the District Court should have granted the 
defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal because the fictitious stash-house 
robbery could not possibly “affect[] commerce” as required for conviction under 
the Hobbs Act.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  Second, Thompson argues that the District 
Court should have granted the motion for discovery to pursue a claim of selective 
enforcement.  We rejected these or very similar arguments in United States v. 
Whitfield, No. 14-3345, and do so here for the same reasons expressed in that 
opinion. 
